Class action lawsuits filed under securities laws against firms exacerbate agency conflicts between shareholders and debt holders in that direct as well as indirect costs arising from shareholder lawsuits deteriorate firms' financial position and lower firm value. In view of this, this paper examines whether banks can price their borrowers' litigation risk in debt contracting. Using a measure of propensity to be sued derived from an econometric model, we empirically investigate the effect of litigation risk on debt contracting. We find that banks charge higher interest spreads on loans to borrowers with higher litigation risk. In addition, banks monitor these firms more closely by providing debt with shorter maturity, more covenants, and more collateral requirements. Furthermore, the impact of litigation risk is less pronounced in regions with weak litigation environments. Our findings suggest that litigation risk affects debt contracting such that banks perceive it to be detrimental and proactively price it and actively monitor high-risk borrowers.
Do Banks Price Litigation Risk in Debt Contracting? Evidence from Class
Action Lawsuits
Introduction
Banks, as creditors, own fixed claims that are more senior than the residual and limited liability claims of shareholders. Nevertheless, their payoff structure has a limited upside potential that exposes them mainly to downside risks. There is broad agreement that shareholder class action lawsuits result in significant valuation losses, which result from not only lawsuits settlements but also reputational costs borne by firms as a result of lawsuits (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Gande and Lewis, 2009 ). However, little is known about whether banks proactively react to litigation risk in their debt contracting, given their superior information processing abilities and direct access to private information. In this paper, we investigate this question with an economic model for the propensity to be sued based on both firm-and industry-specific factors.
To protect the interests of shareholders, the Securities Act of 1934 grants shareholders the right to file a private action in federal court to recover damages as a result of securities fraud. In the event of an actual lawsuit, a drop in the firm's value and reduction of its future cash flow increase its downside risk. Furthermore, a substantial drop in equity value is accompanied by a large increase in leverage, which exacerbates conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt holders. Managers acting in the interest of shareholders may have strong incentives to expropriate debt holder wealth via activities such as asset substitution, dividend overpayment, and so forth. These actions not only increase firm default probability, but also impair the value of collateral, which in turn reduces the recovery rate in the event of default (Lin et al., 2011) . Taken as a whole, shareholder litigation has unintended detrimental impact on banks.
In addition, banks will suffer from reputational loss on the loan market if their borrowers are discovered to be involved in fraud because fraud discovery signals that the banks' monitoring technology is flawed or that they withhold bad information. This will in turn have a negative impact on the banks' future monitoring payoffs. Hence, banks may also have non-contractual incentives to prevent fraud because they are concerned with their reputation of appearing well informed (Lin and Paravisini, 2011) .
Overall, given the detrimental effects and reputational loss from actual lawsuits on debt holders, banks have strong contractual as well as non-contractual incentives to take proactive actions to protect themselves from potential litigation by more actively monitoring borrowers through collecting and verifying fraud-relevant borrower information. We therefore hypothesize that banks will proactively react to borrower litigation risk by charging higher interest spread and requiring more restrictive non-price terms.
To test our hypotheses, we need to first estimate the propensity to be sued (our proxy for ex ante litigation risk). Following Gande and Lewis (2009) and Kim and Skinner (2011) , we derive the measure with an econometric model based on both firm-and industry-specific factors. This prediction model generates superior predictive ability compared to the industry measure and to other prediction models for litigation risk used in the literature. More importantly, it enables us to derive a measure of litigation risk for each firm-year observation, which enlarges our sample to all firms with available data rather than only firms with actual lawsuits filed. Consistent with our hypotheses, our findings suggest that banks proactively react to litigation risk in debt contracting. Specifically, we find that banks charge higher interest spreads on bank loans to firms facing higher ex ante litigation risk. This increase in loan spread is economically significant. For instance, for borrowers with high perceived litigation risk (in the top quintile of perceived litigation risk), banks will charge 11.1% more in loan spread, an average increase of 19 basis points. Our change analysis yields similar results.
We also examine how the pricing of debt changes after firms are actually sued by shareholders. If the debt market has already priced in ex ante litigation risk, then debt holders should not have significant reactions to actual lawsuit filings, unless these filings are unexpected to them. Consistent with this assertion, we find that in the post-filing period the spreads of bank loans increase (do not change) when a firm's ex ante litigation risk is in the lower (upper) quartile group, which implies that the debt market has already priced the firm's perceived litigation risk in debt contracting.
Our results on non-price terms of debt contracting reveal that for firms with higher ex ante litigation risk, banks tend to provide shorter maturity debt, impose more covenants, and are more likely to request collateral on loans. These results are consistent with a higher degree of active monitoring from lenders of borrowers with higher litigation risk, since covenants, collateral, and short maturity are structured as contractual devices to facilitate lender monitoring (Park, 2000; Rajan and Winton, 1995) .
To address the likelihood of a trade-off effect between price and non-price terms, following Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2010), we examine the impact of litigation risk by estimating price and non-price terms using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach, allowing the error terms to be correlated across equations. The results are very similar to the main tests and reinforce our previous evidence that loan contracts to firms with higher ex ante litigation risk are structured to enhance lender monitoring.
As an additional test, we further investigate the impact of ex ante litigation risk on a firm's credit rating. Rating agencies acquire both public and private information to determine a firm's creditworthiness by assessing the likelihood of future cash flows being sufficient to cover debt payments and the recovery rate in the event of default. Credit ratings are relatively stable and less likely to be affected by transient factors such as market sentiment or temporary shocks and hence can serve as another proxy for the cost of debt to validate the relation between ex ante litigation risk and debt contracting. Consistent with the results of loan tests, we find that higher ex ante litigation risk is significantly associated with lower credit ratings.
Lastly, we examine the strength of legal enforcement on the relation between litigation risk (propensity to be sued) and debt contracting. If legal enforcement for shareholder class action lawsuits is weaker, litigation risk is less likely to be a credible threat to firms and banks will price it accordingly. The exogenous litigation environment change in the Ninth Federal Second, this paper contributes to the cost of debt literature by identifying an additional risk factor that affects debt contracting. Several studies have examined the relation between corporate governance and debt contracting and find a negative relation between various corporate governance mechanisms and debt yields or credit ratings (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Klock et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006) . Meanwhile, other studies find that corporate governance has divergent effects on debt contracting (Cremers et al., 2007; Chava et al. 2010) . This study adds to the literature by showing that the risk from shareholder class action lawsuits, a governance mechanism that seeks to discipline managers, can adversely affect the interest of debt holders and hence the price and non-price terms of debt.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and discusses the research question. Section 3 describes the sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 4 explains the research design and presents the empirical results.
Section 5 sets forth our conclusions.
Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
Shareholder class action lawsuits that arise from agency conflicts between shareholders and managers can impose substantial costs, both direct and indirect, on sued firms and their stakeholders. Direct costs consist of settlement costs, attorney fees, and increased director and officer liability insurance premiums, 2 which will dramatically reduce firm cash flow. In addition, firms with greater exposure to litigation risk tend to cut back on capital expenditures and hold more cash in anticipation of future settlement costs (Arena and Julio, 2011) , which constrains their growth and reduces future cash flow available to stakeholders.
Apart from these direct costs, a defendant firm also suffers from indirect costs such as the diversion of managerial resources, reputational damage, and the disruption of relationships with suppliers and customers, which are often more detrimental to firms than direct costs (Engelmann and Cornell, 1988; Johnson et al., 2000; Lowry and Shu, 2002) . For example, Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that the indirect cost arising from the lost productivity of managers alone is likely to outweigh attorney fees and other direct costs. In addition, reputational damage and the disruption of relationships with suppliers and customers weaken a firm's competitive position and increase uncertainty in its operations, which leads to a decline in profitability and a corresponding drop in firm value.
2 Lawsuit settlements account for 8% of beginning total assets or 26% of beginning total shareholder equity as of the settlement year for settled firms in our sample.
Taken together, both direct and indirect costs associated with litigation destroy firm value and hence reduce the value of claims for all stakeholders-both shareholders and debt holders. Prior studies provide consistent evidence that firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits often incur a significant drop in market value on the filing date (Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles, 1998; Gande and Lewis, 2009) . However, these studies focus primarily on the impact of litigation on equity markets. Shareholder class action lawsuits can be costly to debt holders as well. Debt holders have a fixed claim on firm assets and hence their payoff structure has limited upside potential and is mainly exposed to downside risks. A drop in firm value and reduction of its future cash flow increases firm default risk, which in turn exacerbates agency conflicts between shareholders and debt holders. Managers acting in the interests of shareholders would then have strong incentives to expropriate debt holder wealth. For example, managers could invest in riskier investment projects, which increases the value of equity, whose payoff is similar to that of a call option (Merton, 1973) , but reduces the value of debt claims. Managers may also forego investment projects with positive net present value or transfer assets and profits out of their firms. These actions not only increase default probability, but also impair the value of collateral, which in turn reduces recovery rates in the event of default (Lin et al., 2011) . As shown in Figure 1 , the probability of debt covenant violation increases dramatically around the lawsuit filing date. Specifically, the probability of debt covenant violation increases dramatically, from about 4% in the eight quarters prior to the filling to about 16% in the lawsuit filing quarter, then declines slowly in subsequent quarters and remains at 9% after eight quarters, indicating a substantial increase in debt contract breaches due to lawsuit filings.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In addition, banks also experience substantial reputational loss on the syndicated loan market if their borrowers are discovered committing fraud (Lin and Paravisini, 2011 (Guay, 2008) . In addition, covenants are employed to align the monitoring efforts of senior lenders. To maximize their incentives, the senior claim will have the most restrictive covenants (Park, 2010) . Given the detrimental impact of actual lawsuit filings on debt holders, we expect banks to impose more covenants on loans to firms with higher litigation risk.
The second contractual device in borrower monitoring is the maturity structure of the debt contract. Diamond (1991) illustrates that borrowers desire long-term debt when liquidity risk outweighs the benefits of potential future refinancing. However, on the supply side, if information symmetry (private information and monitoring cost) is severe, lenders may provide only shorter maturity debt to borrowers with poor credit quality, since lenders may then have the right to liquidate and take control more quickly. By requiring firms to provide more frequent information disclosures, shorter maturities may be useful in addressing information problems (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; Rajan and Winton, 1995) .
Therefore, if litigation risk indicates additional firm information problems, we expect banks to impose shorter maturities on loans to firms with higher litigation risk.
Collateral is another important debt contracting feature. Collateral is a borrower's pledge of specific assets as security for a loan. The lender can seize the pledged assets if the borrower goes bankrupt. Thus, loans with security requirements have higher recovery rates in bankruptcy (Bharath et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2008; Van Den Castle and Keisman, 1999) . In addition, collateral in loan contracting can be used to alleviate information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders and increase a lender's monitoring incentive (Rajan and Winton, 1995) .
Higher ex ante litigation risk implies more severe agency problems between borrowers and lenders. Therefore, we expect banks to be more likely to require collateral from borrowers with higher litigation risk.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypotheses regarding the nonprice terms of debt contracts.
H2a: Banks will place more stringent covenants on firms with high perceived litigation risk.
H2b: Banks will impose shorter maturities on loans to firms with higher perceived litigation risk.
H2c: Banks will be more likely to impose collateral requirements on loans to firms with higher perceived litigation risk.
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics

Sample selection
Our data cover all firms with private debt (bank loans) issued from 1996 to 2009. The sample of bank loans is obtained from the DealScan database provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). The DealScan database contains both the price and non-price terms of loans. We match firms in the DealScan and Compustat databases using the link table provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) . We acquire stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The data for the actual shareholder class action lawsuits used for the prediction model are from the ISS Securities Class Action database. For firms with multiple lawsuits in a year, we retain only the first record.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires plaintiffs to provide proof of fraud before they can initiate a lawsuit, which limits frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, we begin our sample period in 1996 to limit measurement error. We exclude utilities and financial firms, as well as financially distressed firms (those with negative equity). The final sample contains 14,087 loans (at the facility level) held by 3,331 firms. To eliminate the effects of extreme observations, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails. Table 1 [Insert Table 1 about here]
Descriptive statistics
Research Design and Results
Proxy for ex ante litigation risk
Following Grande and Lewis (2009) and Kim and Skinner (2011), we derive the probability of being sued as a measure of firm ex ante litigation risk based on both firm and industry factors, using all available information for the period 1996 to 2009. The model is described in detail in Appendix B. As shown in Table B2 of Appendix B, the prediction model correctly classifies 97.88% of actually filed lawsuits. To obtain the proxy for ex ante litigation risk based on the information available at the time of loan initiation, we use a modified measure derived from that model based on the firm and industry factors in the most recent three-year period prior to loan initiation (LitiRisk otherwise. In addition, based on firm's class action lawsuit record in our database, we create an objective measure of litigation risk, Sued, a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is involved in a class action lawsuit at least once in our sample period and zero otherwise. In the following main tests, we use the four aforementioned measures as proxies for ex ante litigation risk.
Ex ante litigation risk and loan spread
We investigate whether ex ante litigation risk affects the price terms of debt using the following model: 
where Log loan spread is the natural log of loan spread, measured as the all-in spread drawn from the DealScan database. The all-in spread drawn is defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or a LIBOR equivalent 3 for each dollar drawn down. This measure adds the borrowing spread of the loan over LIBOR to any annual fee paid to the bank group. We use all four measures to proxy for ex ante litigation risk (Litigation risk): LitiRisk, LitiRiskRank, LitiRiskHigh, and Sued, as discussed above. If banks proactively price litigation risk, then we expect the coefficient of Litigation risk to be significantly positive and vice versa.
We include several firm-specific variables identified in the literature as affecting loan spread, such as firm size, leverage, growth opportunity, profitability, tangibility, and Z-score.
Firm size (Size) is measured as the natural log of total assets. Larger firms are more diversified, mature, and have a good reputation in the debt market, implying lower credit risk (Bae and Goyal, 2009 ). Therefore, we expect that larger firms can borrow at lower interest spreads. We also include leverage ratio (Leverage), computed as the sum of long-term debt plus current liabilities to total assets, in the model. Since more highly levered firms are more likely to default, we expect leverage to be positively associated with loan spread. Growth opportunities (MTB) are measured as the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity at yearend. We have no clear predictions for the effect of growth opportunity on loan spread. On the one hand, underinvestment and asset substitution problems are more severe for growth firms (Myers, 1977) . Thus, when approaching bankruptcy, growth firms lose more value (Bae and Goyal, 2009 ). On the other hand, growth opportunities can proxy for additional value over liquidation for debt holders in the event of default (Graham et al., 2008) . Profitability (ROA) is another factor that affects a firm's cost of debt. Better-performing firms are able to generate streams of positive current and future cash flows and thus have lower credit risk. In contrast, when firms are less profitable, managers and shareholders have greater incentive to expropriate assets and/or to increase the risk of doing business (Bae and Goyal, 2009 ). Thus, we expect profitable firms to have lower interest spreads. We also control for asset tangibility (Tangibility), defined as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets.
Tangible assets are easier to liquidate when firms default, which reduces lender losses. In addition, tangible assets make it harder for firms to substitute high-risk assets for low-risk ones and are easier for lenders to monitor (Bae and Goyal, 2009 ). We expect more tangible assets to be associated with lower interest spreads. Finally, we construct a modified Altman Z-score to account for firm credit risk. A higher Z-score indicates better financial health and thus lower credit risk, so we expect it to be negatively associated with loan spread. All of the above variables are measured the year prior to the loan initiation date.
We also control for loan-specific characteristics that prior literature shows to be correlated with the price of debt (Graham et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2011) . We first control for performance pricing (Perform price), a dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility uses a performance pricing grid and zero otherwise. Performance pricing directly links firm accounting performance to interest rates charged on loans; it appears to be a mechanism to make an incomplete contract more complete. By letting borrowers commit to a re-pricing schedule ex ante, the mechanism may affect the cost of writing the contract, the design of covenants and maturity, and the cost of renegotiation (Asquith et al., 2005; Armstrong et al., 2010) . We also include Maturity, defined as the natural log of the loan maturity measured in months, because loans with longer maturity expose banks to firm financial conditions for longer periods. Our model also controls for the loan amount (Log loan amount).
Along with firm-and loan-specific variables, our model controls for the macroeconomic environment by including term spread and credit spread. Credit spread widens in recessions and shrinks in expansions, while term spread increases (decreases) in good (bad) economic environments. Lenders require more compensation for additional credit risk in bad economic times (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Lin et al., 2011 The coefficients of firm-specific control variables are consistent with our prediction.
The coefficient of Size is negative and significant, implying that large firms are more likely to experience lower loan spreads. In addition, the coefficient of leverage is significant and positive. Firms with higher debt levels are more likely to default, leading to higher loan spreads. In contrast, better-performing firms and firms with more tangible assets or better financial health enjoy lower loan spreads. With regard to loan-specific controls, we find that maturity and loan amount are negatively related to loan spread. The association between interest spread and the macroeconomic controls (term spread and credit spread) is also significant and positive.
In sum, the results indicate that banks proactively price litigation risk by charging higher interest spreads to compensate for bearing this additional risk and increase in monitoring cost. It is worth highlighting that the litigation risk measure captures the increase in risk above and beyond any risk captured by the other explanatory variables, such as profitability, marketto-book ratio, and Altman's Z-score. These variables could partially capture the effect of firm performance on credit risk. Finding a significant coefficient for litigation risk indicates that the other variables cannot fully capture the incremental risk due to litigation.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In addition to the level analysis, we examine the effect of changes in litigation risk on changes in loan spread, which accounts for time-invariant common unobservable or omitted firm-specific characteristics that might affect both loan spread and litigation risk. If we assume that the omitted firm-level variable is constant across time, then a change regression should be free of this bias. A number of factors should be taken into account before a change regression is run. In particular, we need to account for the facts that (i) firms may not issue loans every year and (ii) the sample observations in the panel are at the facility level, with multiple facility observations for a firm in a given year. Considering these factors, we first calculate the average
Log loan spread for all facilities in a year for a firm and obtain one observation per firm per year; we then calculate the change in the average Log loan spread, Log loan Spread, the change in litigation risk, Litigation risk, as well as changes in firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables over the time period. Specifically, the model used is as follows:
Log loan spread =Litigation risk + Size + Leverage + MTB + ROA + Tangibility +
where the dependent variable Log loan spread is calculated as the change in log loan spread averaged over all facilities in a year relative to the most recent prior year. Since firms do not receive newly issued bank loans every year, the change does not necessarily take place over two consecutive years. We have two measures of ΔLitigation risk: The first measure, ΔLitiRisk, is the change in the three-year rolling ex ante litigation risk at the beginning of the three years corresponding to the dependent variable. The second measure, ΔLitiRiskRank, is the change of the three-year rolling ex ante litigation risk in terms of ranking (decile) at the beginning of the three years corresponding to the dependent variable. All other variables with the Δ prefix indicate the change in each variable at the beginning of the two years corresponding to the dependent variable and the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix A. All tests include both industry and year fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year levels. [Insert Table 3 about here]
Debt market reaction to litigation surprises
We next investigate whether the debt market responds to actual lawsuits, conditioning on the ex ante litigation risk. If the debt market has already priced in ex ante litigation risk, then debt holders should not have a significant reaction to the actual filing of lawsuits unless the filings are surprises to them. If firms with lower ex ante litigation risk experience actual lawsuits, this would be a surprise to the debt market. We expect loan spreads to increase after the filing of lawsuits for these surprise firms. In contrast, if firms with higher ex ante litigation risk experience actual lawsuits, this is consistent with expectations on the debt market. Loan spreads will not differ significantly in the pre-and post-filing periods. All explanatory variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the initiation of each loan facility. All tests include loan type and loan purpose dummies and control for industry and year fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year levels. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix A.
We present the results of the analyses of the effects of non-price terms on bank loans in columns 1 to 3 of [Insert Table 5 about here]
Additional analyses: The simultaneous estimation of price and non-price terms
In the previous tests, we investigate price and non-price terms separately. Agency theory suggests that there is likely to be a trade-off between the interest rate and non-price terms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Smith and Warner, 1979) . At loan initiation, all contract terms are determined simultaneously between lenders and borrowers. To address this issue, following Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2010), we estimate price and nonprice terms as a system of equations using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, allowing the error terms to be correlated across equations. Table 6 presents the results. The coefficients of litigation risk are very close in both magnitude and sign to those in the previous tests, which reinforces our previous evidence that banks do vary contract terms in response to litigation risk.
[Insert 
where Rating is a variable constructed based on an S&P-issued firm-level credit rating, which is assigned 10 for AAA, 9 for AA+, 8 for AA, and so on. The remaining variables are defined the same as in previous tests. The model includes industry and year dummies.
In panel A of Table 7 , we find that in all specifications litigation risk is negatively associated with credit ratings. That is, firms with lower litigation risk receive better credit ratings. We also conduct the change analysis for the credit rating tests in are qualitatively similar to those in the level analysis. This finding constitutes further evidence that ex ante litigation risk adversely affects firm credit rating, which is consistent with the debt holder's perspective in the previous tests.
[Insert Table 7 and 8 about here]
Additional analyses: An exogenous change in a firm's litigation environment
We further examine the impact of legal enforcement on bank reactions to litigation risk in debt contracting. The strength of legal enforcement will affect the credibility of litigation threat. If the legal enforcement for shareholder class action lawsuits is weaker, litigation risk is less likely be to a credible threat to firms and banks will not price ex ante litigation risk into loan contracts accordingly. On July 2, 1999, the court decision on SGI announced that the Ninth Circuit required plaintiffs to "plead, at a minimum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness," the strictest interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 among all circuits (Hopkins, 2012). The SGI decision makes it harder to certify a shareholder class action lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit, which decreases the chances of a successful suit. As a consequence, there has been a dramatic decline in class action filings and an increase in the dismissal rate in that circuit since (Perino, 2003; Pritchard and Sale, 2005) . Hence, the SGI decision can serve as a powerful setting for an exogenous shift of litigation environment since the legal enforcement has been much weaker since for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit.
We divide our sample firm-years into two groups based on whether or not they are affected by SGI decision. Next we rerun the main tests on these two groups separately. The indicator variable Ninth equals one if a firm is headquartered in the Ninth Circuit during the post-SGI period (after July 1999) and zero otherwise. Panel B of Table 2 presents the results of the effect of litigation risk on loan spread for these two groups. If Ninth = 1, the litigation risk proxy has virtually no effect on loan spread, which suggests that in the post-SGI period, since it is hard to certify lawsuits of firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit, ex ante litigation risk has no material effect on loan spread. On the contrary, if Ninth = 0, since the SGI decision does not affect the litigation environment, the coefficient of the litigation risk proxy is significant and positive in all model specifications. Tests on non-price terms (panel B in Table 5 ) and credit ratings (panel B in Table 7 ) provide similar results. These differential results for a shift in litigation environment provide further evidence that banks vary their pricing terms in response to perceived litigation risk. These findings strengthen our main argument that banks react to firm litigation risk in debt contracting.
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of litigation risk on debt contracting. Shareholder class action lawsuits can be detrimental to debt holders because both the direct and indirect costs of actual lawsuits destroy firm value, which exacerbates agency conflicts between shareholders and debt holders. Our results reveal that banks proactively employ both price and non-price terms to hedge against the adverse impact of shareholder litigation and are actively involved in monitoring firms with high litigation risk. Specifically, banks charge higher interest spreads on loans to firms with higher litigation risk. Banks also structure loan contracts to facilitate monitoring borrowers with high litigation risk by shortening the maturity of loans, imposing more covenants, and requiring collateral on loans to such firms. Additional analysis using credit rating as an alternative proxy for the cost of debt provides further evidence that litigation risk increases firm risk above and beyond other known sources of credit risk. We also run a series of robustness checks that yield results similar to those for our main tests. 
LitiRisk
Ex ante litigation risk, which is an out-of-sample predicted probabilities, where the probit regression parameters are obtained on a basis of the previous three-year rolling window, and the estimates are used to generate predicted probabilities for the following year
LitiRiskRank
The decile ranking of ex ante litigation risk (LitiRisk). A higher value indicates higher ex ante litigation risk of the firm with 10 (1) as the highest (lowest) rank.
LitiRiskHigh
A dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm's ex ante litigation risk is among the top two deciles of the litigation risk decile ranking, and 0 otherwise.
Sued
A dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is involved in class action lawsuit in our sample period, and 0 otherwise.
Post litigation
A dummy variable that is set equal to 1 in the year of initiation of a lawsuit and remains set to 1 thereafter, and zero otherwise
Firms characteristics
Size Natural log of total assets at year-end Leverage (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/total assets MTB Market value of equity scaled by book value of equity at the end of year ROA Income before extraordinary items/total assets Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment/total assets Altman Modified Altman's (1968) Z-score calculated as (1.2 * working capital + 1.4 * retained earnings + 3.3 * EBIT + 1.0 * sales) / total assets. We use a modified Z-score, which does not include the ratio of market value of equity to book value of total debt, because a similar term, market-to-book, enters the regressions as a separate variable
S&P rating
A variable constructed based on Standard & Poor's-issued firm-level credit rating, which is assigned 10 for AAA, 9 for AA+, 8 for AA, and so on
Bank loan characteristics
Log loan spread
Natural log of loan spread. Loan spread is measured as all-in spread drawn in the DealScan database. All-in spread drawn is defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. (For loans not based on LIBOR, LPC converts the spread into LIBOR terms by adding or subtracting a differential that is adjusted periodically.) This measure adds the borrowing spread of the loan over LIBOR to any annual fee paid to the bank group
Perform price
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility uses performance pricing, and zero otherwise
Number of covenants Total number of financial and general covenants of a loan facility
Log loan maturity Natural log of loan maturity measured in months
Log loan amount Natural log of loan facility amount. Loan amount is measured in millions of dollars Secured A dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise
Loan type dummies
Dummy variable for loan types, including term loan, revolver greater than one year, revolver less than 1 year, and 364-day facility, etc.
Loan purpose dummies
Dummy variable for loan purposes, including corporate purposes, debt repayment, working capital, takeover, etc.
Macroeconomic factors
Credit spread
The difference between BAA corporate bond yield and AAA corporate bond yield (data source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors)
Term spread
The difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield (data source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors)
Appendix B Measuring ex ante litigation risk
To investigate debt holder perception of firm future litigation risk, a model measuring propensity to be sued is required. Gande and Lewis (2009) and Kim and Skinner (2011) develop a model based on firm-and industry-specific information that generates relatively good predictions of firm litigation risk. We adopt that probit model to estimate the perceived litigation risk from shareholders, with the following modifications, using all available information for the period 1996 to 2009.
Prob (lawsuit i,t+1 =1)= α i,t + β 1 (Return i,t ) + β 2 (Turnover i,t ) + β 3 (Return volatility i,t ) + β 4 (Beta i,t ) + β 5 (Skewness i,t ) + β 6 (MVE i,t ) + β 7 (ROA i,t ) + β 8 (Density i,t ) + β 9 (Density square) + β 10 (Biotech i,t ) + β 11 (Electronics i,t ) + β 12 (Computer i,t ) + β 13 (Retail i,t ) + ε i,t (B1)
where Lawsuit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a securities class action lawsuit was recorded by the ISS Securities Class Action database during a fiscal year, zero otherwise;
Return is the market-adjusted 12-month annual stock return over a fiscal year; Turnover is measured as trading volume accumulated over the 12-month period ending with the fiscal yearend month scaled by beginning of the year shares outstanding; Return volatility is the standard deviation of the firm's daily return over a fiscal year; Beta is the slope coefficient from regressing daily returns on the CRSP' Equal Weighted Index; Skewness is the skewness of the firm's daily return over a fiscal year; MVE is the natural log of the year-end market value of equity; ROA is return on assets, measured as (Income before extraordinary items)/total assets;
Density is the percentage of firms subject to class action in each four-digit Standard Industrial Table B1 as follows: Table B2 reports estimates, marginal effects, and z statistics from a probit estimation of the litigation risk following Model B1 using all the information available during the period 1996 to 2009. To get ex ante measure of litigation risk for each firm-year, we use another variation of the above probit model. We first obtain parameters of the above model on a rolling-window basis of the previous three years, and the estimates are used to generate predicted probabilities for the following year, which is our first measure in the main tests, LitiRisk. For example, for the predicted probabilities for firms in 2001, we use data from 1999 to 2000 to estimate the necessary parameter estimates and apply them to the 2001 data. Additionally, to mitigate the effects of extreme values, we rank LitiRisk into deciles to get our second measure LitiRiskRank, with a higher value indicating higher ex ante litigation risk of the firm. The third measure (LitiRiskHigh) is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm's ex ante litigation risk is among the top two deciles of the litigation risk ranking, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the change in S&P rating. ΔLitiRisk is the change of three-year rolling ex ante litigation risk at the beginning of the three years corresponding to the dependent variable. ΔLitiRiskRank is the change of three-year rolling ex ante litigation risk in terms of ranking (decile) at the beginning of the three years corresponding to the dependent variable. All other variables with prefix 'Δ' indicate the change in each variable at the beginning of the two years corresponding to the dependent variable, and the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level at both tails. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses based on the robust standard errors clustered at firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) 
